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A Federal Tax 
System 
for the 1980s. 
by WILLIAM L. RABT/ Senior Tax Partner 
Too often the tax professional is viewed as being engaged //merely"in trying to obtain 
special tax benefits for his c l ients-
finding loopholes, seeking some 
modicum of support for far-out tax 
positions, acting as a taxpayer advocate 
in tax controversies. Any such descrip-
tion displays a shallow understanding of 
both the professional's role and how 
the U.S. tax system works. 
The tax system is complex and ever 
changing, because legislators and 
administrators alike have found it the 
most responsive and efficient way of 
fine-tuning the American economy, of 
meeting the volatile needs and desires 
of the American taxpayer/voter. 
Therefore, before discussing the future 
effectiveness of our tax system, I'd like 
to discuss briefly the social significance 
of the existing system and the CPAs role 
in that system. 
How vital is the role that the tax 
practitioner plays in the system? Let us 
use the example of a subsidy program 
that the government sets up to stimu-
late the purchase of energy conserving 
devices. Setting up such a subsidy 
program would be a time-consuming 
and administratively expensive task. 
First, enabling legislation would have to 
be passed. Then an appropriation 
would be required. Either an existing 
agency would have to staff-up to meet 
the demands of this new program or a 
new agency would need to be brought 
into existence. Regulations would have 
to be written and application forms and 
procedures adopted. The first requests 
for the subsidy money might take quite 
some time to process. Perhaps two 
years after the legislation was proposed, 
an actual program might be in opera-
tion—by which time the energy 
problem would have passed beyond 
the point where that program would be 
of any help. 
Contrast this with using the tax 
system to provide this subsidy either 
through a deduction or a credit. The 
minute a program was proposed, tax 
people would start monitoring on 
behalf of their clients. The enactment 
of the proposal would result in almost 
instantaneous communication to 
affected clients about how they could 
take advantage of it. Clients in 
manufacturing or selling—of solar 
panels, let's say—would quickly adver-
tise the new subsidy. Marketing 
programs would be operational based 
upon the tax practitioners' interpreta-
tions of the new statute—and the first 
installation actually generated would be 
almost concurrent with legislative 
enactment. 
This is hardly the whole story of the 
social role of the tax consultant. But it is 
one part that is often overlooked. We, 
not the IRS nor the Treasury, are the 
element that makes viable the tax 
system's role as a fine-tuner of the 
economy. (The administration of the tax 
system by the IRS is key to its continued 
existence, of course. If voluntary 
compliance in self-assessment drops 
below some critical level, the whole 
involved structure starts to disintegrate 
—a point to which we shall return 
briefly at the end of this article.) 
The fine-tuning role is significant, of 
course. It involves big dollars. The tax 
expenditures budget is well over $250 
billion currently and rising fast. Further, 
these tax subsidies are not them-
selves subject to tax, nor do they 
generally reduce other deductions. 
Thus, compared to subsidies that are 
taxable income or that reduce the basis 
for depreciation, a dollar of tax benefit 
is probably worth two. So we CPAs play 
a vital role in running a $500 billion tax 
subsidy program. And $500 billion is 
vastly bigger than any other subsidy 
program that the federaJ government 
administers. 
Given this context, and given the 
repeated need that tax practitioners 
have to examine the basics of our 
federal tax system and explain it to 
successive generations of entrepreneurs 
and business executives, I believe CPAs 
in tax practice are uniquely qualified to 
speak out to the public and to Congress 
on the fundamentals of how our federal 
tax system operates. Herewith, then, are 
some concerns that have been slowly 
germinating in my mind. 
What's Wrong With the Income Tax? 
The present federal income tax can be 
viewed as a ratchet mechanism. It is 
relatively easy to increase tax benefits. 
In fact, it is politically difficult to avoid 
increases. For example, once alimony 
was reclassified so that it could be 
taken as a deduction in addition to the 
taxpayer taking the standard deduction, 
then charitable organizations started 
clamoring for reclassification of chari-
table contributions so that they, too, 
could be taken as a deduction in 
addition to the standard deduction. 
But the ability to use tax benefits to 
manage the economy is limited, 
because it is difficult, almost impossible, 
to curtail tax benefits substantially once 
they affect large numbers of taxpayers. 
Deductions for mortgage interest and 
real estate taxes act as tremendous 
subsidies to the housing market. They 
have been in the tax law for decades— 
perhaps long before they even were 
viewed as subsidies. No one consciously 
determined that this aspect of the 
federal tax system should be structured 
to stimulate the conversion of apart-
ment buildings to cooperatives or 
condominiums in 1981—and yet the 
current system contributed substantially 
to that result, as demonstrated by the 
shortage of rental apartments. The 
system is simply not able to do anything 
major about distortions of its purpose. 
Any proposal now to completely 
eliminate deductibility of mortgage 
interest and real estate taxes probably 
never would leave the House Ways and 
Means Committee. 
Attempts to limit and curtail benefits 
are, in fact, a major cause of the tax 
law's present complexity. The 1969 and 
1976 tax reform acts, plus intervening 
technical amendments, illustrate the 
type of tax reform that our congres-
sional tax leaders feel is politically 
palatable. These acts do not withdraw 
tax benefits so much as impose limits to 
their use. The limits are drafted with 
exquisite care, in order not to hurt large 
numbers of taxpayers so much that they 
will raise a ruckus. The 1981 act added 
more of the same, and the 1982 act 
continues the tradition. 
Deductibility of interest paid, there-
fore, has not been directly challenged. 
Instead, the 1969 Tax Reform Act initially 
made excess investment interest 
expense a tax preference. Since few 
people were affected —and even fewer 
understood it—interest as a tax prefer-
ence slid in quite easily. The same act 
automatically provided for a shift of 
investment interest out of the tax 
preference category at a later date. 
Limits were then put on the tax benefit 
derived from investment interest if it 
exceeded investment income, including 
long-term capital gains, by $25,000. The 
limit was one-half the remainder. In 
1976 the net investment interest that 
triggered tax deduction limitations 
shrank to $10,000—and long-term 
capital gains were eliminated from the 
definition of investment incdme. Thus, 
most of the benefit of the interest 
expense deduction was withdrawn bit 
by bit from a handful of taxpayers. 
(Ironically, the impact of the new limits 
on deductibility of interest expense has 
affected mainly the entrepreneurial 
individual whose diasppearance from 
the economic scene has led to great 
lamentation.) 
Some observers/legislators who have 
been intimately involved in the 
congressional tax-writing process in 
recent years conclude from such 
behavior that the federal income tax is 
"burned out." It has lost its drive, its 
creative potential, its flexibility — its 
effectiveness in today's economy. They 
even fear that it is becoming impossible 
to administer the tax law. 
But even if the diagnosis is correct 
today, I think it extremely unwise to let 
these conditions persist. If the nation is 
to continue to control inflation and 
improve its ability both to satisfy the 
needs of its citizens and to compete 
effectively in the world economy, we 
need to do something to restore our tax 
system to its former state of usefulness 
as a fiscal tool. 
Basic Tax Reform 
William Simon, Charls M. Walker, and 
the staff of the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment wrestled with the same problem 
six years ago—albeit at a time when the 
inflation situation seemed less unman-
agable. The result, in January 1977, was a 
230-page opus, Blueprints for Basic Tax 
Reform (Government Printing Office). 
Simon and the others cited the three 
basic principles of equity, efficiency, and 
simplicity as the cornerstone on which 
to rejuvenate the income tax system. 
Blueprints concluded that either of two 
models was feasible, depending on the 
degree to which taxation should foster 
investment and inhibit consumption. 
One model was essentially the 
present federal income tax system, with 
a number of specific modifications, 
including: 
• Integration of corporation and 
individual income taxes, coupled with 
elimination of the corporate income tax. 
• Full taxation of capital gains after 
allowing a step-up in basis for inflation 
(and full deduction of capital losses). 
• Taxation of municipal bond interest. 
The other model emphasized 
taxation of consumption and was based 
on cash flow. "A consumption tax differs 
from an income tax in excluding savings 
from the tax base. In practical terms, 
this means that net savings, as well as 
gifts made, are subtracted from gross 
receipts to compute the tax base. 
Withdrawals from savings are included 
in gross receipts to compute the tax 
base." (Blueprints, P. 9). 
While implementation of either 
model would require a radical alteration 
in our present income tax structure, 
either could be a natural outgrowth and 
a total replacement of what already 
exists. The objection to either approach 
might be that it has no constituency. 
But taxation of oneself seldom does 
attract enthusiastic support—at least 
until compared to some alternative that 
is even less attractive. We now face that 
alternative. The U.S. may have to 
choose radical tax change or else risk 
disastrous and uncontrolled inflation. 
The consumption model of Blueprints 
would fight inflation by encouraging 
investment rather than consumption, 
and would do so without the direct 
inflationary jolt that would result, 
for instance, from the imposition of, or 
increase in, a value-added tax. 
A Touche Ross Proposal 
If a basic tax reform, a la Blueprints, is 
regarded as too revolutionary, perhaps 
an evolutionary approach would be 
more palatable-and thus more politi-
cally possible. The 1969 Tax Reform Act 
spawned what is now called the 
"add-on"minimum tax on tax prefer-
ences; while the Revenue Act of 1978 
spawned the "alternative"minimum tax. 
Both were attempts to tinker with the 
income tax structure by offsetting the 
more extreme results produced by 
other tax provisions. 
An alternative consumption tax 
against inflation (ACT against inflation) 
would take a similar approach, but 
would tend to encourage investment 
and discourage consumption. The 
description that follows is intended as 
an illustration only, since the basic 
concept is quite flexible. 
A separate schedule for the ACT tax 
return , to be filed with Form 1040 
showing gross income over $20,000, 
would start with adjusted gross income. 
To this would be added: 
• The long-term capital gain 
deduction. 
• The tax basis of assets sold. 
• Tax-free municipal bond income. 
• Gifts and bequests received. 
From the resulting total, which would 
be ACT gross receipts, there would be 
subtracted: 
• Gifts made. 
• Investment made. 
A 25 percent tax would be imposed 
on the resulting ACT net receipts. 
Negative ACT net receipts, unless 
caused by gifts made, would entitle one 
to a 25 percent refund (or reduction in 
the amount of income tax that other-
wise would be due). 
The effect of such an ACT would 
be to impose a 25 percent tax on 
consumption, if the amount exceeded 
the regular income tax, or provide a 25 
percent subsidy for any form of invest-
ment as a credit against the regular 
income tax. 
The U.S. income tax has evolved over 
a 73-year history. It is now an accepted 
part of our economy and is woven into 
the framework of our institutions. The 
suggestion of radical change always 
creates rather justified protests that 
established relationships will be dis-
turbed and existing values destroyed. 
We thus feel trapped within our own 
history and within the framework of our 
own institutions. But we can break this 
mold if we wish. 
The alternatives we face in tax reform 
call for either a radical revamping and 
purifying of the present federal income 
tax system, a la William Simon's 
Blueprints, or else more of the paper 
clip and cellophane tape tax tinkering 
that has characterized tax legislation 
since 1964. The former does not seem 
likely. Given the latter, I suggest that the 
Alternative Consumption Tax (ACT) 
might well be the approach to take. 
That, in addition to the more liberal 
capital cost recovery and marginal rate 
reductions of the 1981 tax legislation, 
plus more effective administration, 
might give us the momentum to make 
it through the eighties in better style 
than the prognosticators of stagflation 
would believe possible. 
A Final Thought 
More effective administration? Of 
course. No tax bureaucracy can succeed 
in administering the U.S. tax structure 
unless it is given the funds and the 
congressional support to get the job 
done. Much of the present public 
distrust of the federal income tax stems, 
I am convinced, from congressional 
unwillingness to provide the IRS with 
the people, the money, and the legisla-
tion to adequately administer existing 
law. The IRS should be able to get funds 
if it can demonstrate that there is a net 
"profit" to the Treasury on each added 
dollar appropriated. While we have to 
be sensitive to the dangers of IRS 
overreaching, there may be even greater 
dangers in turning IRS into a paper tiger, 
or a long-shot losing number in "the 
nation's tax lottery." For if the tax system 
does not function effectively, then the 
long-run substitute for what we have 
had will be the capricious, pernicious, 
destructive tax that is called inflation. £ 
